The Informationist

Inchoate Imperialism Part II: Policy Prescriptions

A week-or-so ago I posted an essay arguing that if we want to devise reasonable policies for dealing with the Middle East, we must first understand the region. That assertion is uncontroversial. The rest of my argument was likely more so: I explained that the fundamental idea that has shaped the modern Middle East is an inchoate sense of imperialism among the region’s Sunni Arabs. A second toxic philosophy entered the mix with Khomeinism, an expansionist revolutionary movement in the spirit of nineteenth century European socialism and anarchism, though cloaked in the language of Shiism. The region’s other philosophies, including both Zionism (which has long played a significant role) and Kurdish nationalism (which is growing in importance rapidly) are expressions of self-determination among the region’s ethnic minorities—and thus inherently antithetical to both inchoate imperialism and revolutionary Khomeinism.

This essay picks up where that one left off. It addresses the questions that really interest people: So what? Assuming that my explanation is correct, what should the U.S. (and the broader West) do about it? What, if any, policy prescriptions flow from this understanding? And how do they differ from what we are doing now?

The answers flow from a combination of ideals and pragmatism. From the idealistic perspective, certain core values must predominate. U.S. policy has always been—and should remain—anti-imperialist, anti-revolutionary, and pluralist. We believe in individual rights, and recognize that functioning liberal systems require a balance between institutional integrity and individual self-expression. We believe that every individual has the right to live in a society respectful of his or her basic identity—gender, race, faith, etc. We believe that people have a right to own and trade property, deserve at least a significant portion of the benefits of their labors, and bear at least primary responsibility for their own decisions. Admittedly, our record in supporting these ideals has been less than perfect, but they remain core beliefs that should guide all of our long-term policy considerations. In the specific context of the Middle East, they translate into some clear long-term goals:

• Defuse the inchoate pan-Sunni Arab imperial movement. Promote the assertion of individual national identities among the citizens of the twenty-plus (depending upon how you count) Sunni Arab states. Bolster the “state” aspects of the nation-state system throughout the region (notwithstanding the widespread recognition that the nature of the nation-state system continues to evolve).

• Contain the Khomeinist revolution until it falls under the weight of its own contradictions. Apply significant diplomatic, economic, information, and education campaigns to hasten its collapse. Reserve military interventions to those necessary to prevent escalations (i.e., movements toward WMD) or expansions (i.e., exports of irregular international terror forces) of the revolution.

• Recognize, support, and promote movements of ethnic self-determination. Emphasize the need for responsible self-determination. Given the overlap among “historic homelands,” no ethnic group anywhere on the planet can possibly sustain a state across its entire homeland without necessarily disenfranchising another (neighboring) ethnic group. Promulgate the notion that a modern ethnonational state in part of an historic homeland is a complete realization of ethnic self-determination. Establish a relinquishment of all political claims beyond state boundaries as a quid pro quo for integration into the international community.

• Recalibrate our attitude towards refugees. Large numbers of “stateless people” are simultaneously victims of injustice and guarantors of future instability and cascading further injustice. Resettle refugees among ethnic kinsmen, in culturally similar environments, if possible. Allocate ample resources to aid in the resettlement. Divorce the concepts of refugee resettlement (critical for stability, peace, and individual liberty) and refugee compensation (important for longer-term notions of justice).

• Promote and assist the “nation” aspects of the nation-state system throughout the region. Emphasize the relationship between trustworthy institutions and economic development, and the relationship between individual rights and individual development. Seek ways to guarantee that investments will outlive rulers or regimes; that at least the majority of residents share the option of citizenship; that citizens develop an affinity for their specific nation distinct from the affinity that they may also feel for ethnic, religious, spiritual, or philosophical kinsmen who are not co-nationals; and that individual citizens recognize that they retain broad latitude for self-expression within their national identity.

So much for the ideals and the long-term goals. Here’s where the pragmatism comes in: Every one of those goals is more easily said than done. In a region beset by permanent overlapping crises, who has time for long-term planning? Iraq and Gaza are becoming anarchic safe havens for terrorists. Iran is marching towards nuclear weapons, and funding a Khomeinist state-within-a-state in Southern Lebanon. A bit further afield, Iraq’s Kurds are angling for independence and supporting PKK terrorist activity in Turkey. A strongman authoritarian willing to cut deals with Islamofascists seems to be the only source of quasi-stability in a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Every place that allows elections drives home the reality that when the Mosque is the only acceptable place for dissent, the alternative to ruling regimes is invariably religious radicals. Those are today’s challenges. Do we have time for idealistic long-term thinking? On the flipside, Dubai, Bahrain, and other parts of the Gulf are flourishing despite the complete lack of liberal institutions. Would they even entertain our ideals?

Pragmatism teaches a few important lessons. First and foremost, crises do require attention—but they require attention to both effect and cause. Some of our greatest recent crisis managers like to describe themselves as “realists” (Kissinger, Weinberger, Baker, Powell, Papa Bush, Scowcroft, and Brzezinski all come to mind). Their realism, however, extended only as far as necessary to resolve the crisis at hand; they showed no interest in defusing its underlying causes. The 1990/91 Iraq policy is perhaps the finest example of this approach. The “international community” defused the immediate crisis—the invasion of Kuwait—quite effectively. Without addressing the underlying causes of that invasion, however, the U.S.-led coalition locked an unsustainable policy in place for more than a decade, making the inevitably bloody end game bloodier by the year. In a rather ironic twist of history, the Clinton administration managed to dance through the minefield of Iraq, leaving it to explode on many of the same people who laid the mines—including the son of their leader. Few care to note this irony, however. Their facile read on Iraq is that it was out of the news for a long time, the U.S. changed policies in 2003, and is today a high-profile mess. A fairer read would be that George W. Bush inherited and untenable policy, that 9/11 made such untenable policies a luxury we could ill afford, that the U.S. changed policies in 2003, and that Iraq moved from a low-profile disaster to a high-profile disaster.

That observation leads to a second key element of pragmatism: Sometimes all of the options on the table are bad; “success” consists of selecting the least bad. It is hard to dispute that Iraq today is in bad shape. The salient question should be whether any combination of policies that the U.S. might have pursued over the past five years might have allowed it to assume a good shape as a healthy society. If the answer is “no” (as I believe it is), the analyses of the policies we did adopt will have to dig deeper. The state of Iraq today can neither affirm nor discredit recent U.S. and international policies; only its state relative to what might otherwise have been can inform the discussion. Such deeper analyses, though, are fodder for future essays—not for this one. For this one, the key lesson is that least bad is often the best you can do.

One message to emerge from our recent Iraq policies, however, does illustrate a third key pragmatic principle: incrementalism. Iraq entered 2003 as a state with zero individual liberties and overpowering Baathist institutions. It ended 2003 as a state with extreme individual autonomy and no indigenous institutions. As a result, it whipsawed from the degenerate state of fascism—namely totalitarianism—to the degenerate state of liberalism—namely anarchy. Functioning liberal societies cannot develop overnight; they require significant institutional infrastructure. Capitalist markets cannot thrive in the absence of trustworthy courts to enforce contracts and property rights. Democratic rotations of power cannot occur in the absence of confidence that future fair, free elections will occur. In many cases, incrementalism combines with the least-bad principle to favor strongmen capable of imposing order while liberal institutions emerge, grow, and gain the respect of the citizenry. Our asserted approach to Pakistan, for example, rests upon such incrementalism. We tolerate Musharraf’s authoritarianism under the guise of a necessary step towards liberalism. That assertion serves the pragmatic part of the equation. It also, however, returns us to our ideals. What are we doing to ensure that liberal institutions arise in Pakistan? Mere lip service to our ideals is hardly sufficient.

The crux of American foreign policy must thus balance our traditional, long-term, idealistic opposition to both empires and revolutions; our embrace of individualism; our recognition of minority rights and self-determination; our operation within the nation-state system; and our general sense of justice; with short-term nods to crisis management, incrementalism, and the selection of least-bad alternatives.

What might this balance look like today, and throughout the near future? While it’s tough to devise a specific priority ordering, here are some of the things that we should be doing:

• Learn and apply the local rules of engagement. Much has been written about our tepid response to the attacks in Fallujah in the spring of 2004, when we awoke to see front-page photos of charred American bodies dangling from a bridge. Relatively few of these discussions, however, have noted the implicit message that Americans will not even avenge their own. Who could believe that we will avenge our friends? This demonstration creates perverse incentives. We invest (inadequately) in “hearts and minds” campaigns designed to preach the benefits of liberalism, and as a consequence, of being pro-American. We ignore, however, the most basic lesson of the liberalism we preach: rational decision-making nets costs and benefits. Even assuming that everyone on the planet agrees that a pro-American agenda confers greater benefits than does any other agenda, what are its costs? Our insistence upon following our own civilized standards in setting our rules of engagement ensures that the costs of being anti-American are lower than the costs of being anti-Iranian, anti-Baathist, anti-al Qaeda, etc. In a setting focused on minimizing costs rather than maximizing benefits (as most crisis zones are), rational thinkers will gravitate toward anti-Americanism. The only way to reverse this trend is to increase the costs of anti-Americanism. Our current surge is a small step in the right direction, but unless accompanied by a convincing demonstration of the significant sustained costs of anti-Americanism, it cannot achieve much long-term good.

• Promote Shiite Arab nationalism as an alternative to Khomeinism. Khomeinism, as noted, is not a Shiite movement, but rather a classic revolutionary movement wrapped in Shiite verbiage. Nevertheless, its potential appeal among downtrodden Shiites is as evident as was the appeal of Communism among exploited workers. Khomeinism promises dignity and supremacy to a despised minority in the short run, and a utopian future in the long run. Its empirical failures in Iran notwithstanding, it remains the only political movement on the planet today that speaks directly to Shiite concerns. As long as it retains that unique position, its popularity and influence throughout the Shiite community is likely to grow. The only effective way to combat its spread is with an alternative narrative and philosophy. Fortunately, the elements of such a competing philosophy already exist. A nationalistic Shiite movement that viewed temporal authority as distinct from—but with respect for—spiritual authority would fit the bill. Unfortunately, such a movement is inconsistent with current state boundaries. Though Shiites range from a sizable minority to an small majority in states around the Middle East, they are nowhere a large enough majority to sustain an explicitly Shiite state that rested upon anything other than the suppression of minorities and perpetual civil war. The international insistence upon the maintenance of all of the regions borders will thus guarantee the spread of revolutionary Khomeinism as the only meaningful Shiite counterweight to Sunni imperialism. We must therefore move away from that insistence, and consider redrawing borders. Given the current regional situation, two Shiite mini-states already exist: one in Southern Iraq, and one in Southern Lebanon. The Lebanese mini-state is already irredeemably Khomeinist. Our only viable choices for dealing with Hezbollah are to crush it or neuter its ability to serve as an irregular auxiliary to the Iranian army. Disarmament and conversion to a “normal” Lebanese political party would obviously be preferable, but may not be possible. The Iraqi mini-state, on the other hand, offers brighter prospects. In large part because of its proximity to Iran, these Arabs chafe at the thought of Persian dominance. They are cooperating with American security forces. And their recognized leader, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, has been both a voice for moderation and an advocate of splitting temporal and spiritual authority. The U.S. has a real opportunity to help shape a nationalist Shiite movement by supporting an independent Shiite state in Southern Iraq—thereby dealing a blow to both Sunni imperialism and Khomeinism. We should grab it.

• Direct Kurdish nationalism along a supportable, responsible path. So much for Southern Iraq. Up in the north, the Kurds are angling for independence. The arguments against them vary greatly from those forwarded in opposition to Shiite independence in the south. Few opponents seem to believe that an independent Kurdistan would become a radical anti-American or anti-Western state. Instead, they worry about its effect on the supposed sanctity of borders, and above all on Turkey. As a result, we watch silently as various steps towards independence and regional war occur sub rosa, pretending all the while that things will work themselves out. The generally pro-Western Kurds continue to harbor PKK terrorists and issue veiled (or not-so-veiled) claims to the parts of the historic Kurdish homeland that fall within the borders of Turkey, Syria, and Iran. The American approach to this situation should be clear and harsh. We should support responsible Kurdish independence. We should express support for an independent Kurdistan within the current Kurdish regions of Iraq—essentially, the terrain that has functioned as an autonomous Kurdistan for more than fifteen years. We should also, however, make it clear that the establishment of a Kurdish state in part of the historic Kurdish homeland is a complete and total realization of Kurdish self-determination, and insist that the new government enshrine that belief in its founding institutions. We should also announce unequivocally that the border between Turkey and Kurdistan is an integral NATO border, and that we will view any cross-border activity, including terrorist infiltrations and raids, as an attack on NATO that triggers our collective security arrangements. At the same time though, we need to prepare for another refugee crisis, as at least some (possible many) Kurds may flee east from Turkey, and a smaller number of Turcoman Iraqis may flow west. As in all such cases, we should work with the host countries to resettle their kinsmen and defer discussions of compensation, rather than insist upon repatriation to countries whose governments the refugees do not trust (and vice versa). I have long argued that the U.S. needs to rethink its approach to Turkey. Our treatment of the country as an inevitable EU member (against all reasonable evidence) rather than as a lynchpin of a new Middle East is a huge mistake. Our refusal to acknowledge both the reality and the likelihood of an independent Kurdistan along Turkey’s eastern border makes a smooth transition unlikely. Explicit but conditional support for Kurdish independence promises the best prospects for smoothing this difficult secession from the Sunni Arab Empire.

• Encourage Israel to declare permanent borders, offer citizenship to all people resident within those borders, and relinquish all political claims to lands beyond those borders, in exchange for NATO membership. If it’s good enough for the Kurds, it’s good enough for the Jews. Israel has some tough choices to make, but Arab rejectionism has spared it the agony of choosing. In the name of promoting diplomacy and a mythical “peace process,” we have joined much of the world in pretending that perpetual ambiguity about borders, citizenship, and refugees is a good thing. It is not. It works against American interests, feeds the flames of Sunni Arab imperialism, creates tension within both the Jewish and Arab world, and perpetuates the problem of stateless persons. Unfortunately, Israel does not have the luxury of making necessary choices, because the Sunni Arabs will pocket every concession without giving an inch. The only way for Israel to make effective choices is for large parts of the world to embrace reasonable Israeli choices; Arab pragmatists may eventually accede to a fait accompli. In Israel’s case, it means formalizing Ben Gurion’s realization of the 1930s: A recognized Jewish state within part of the historic Jewish homeland represents a complete political realization of the Zionist dream of Jewish self-determination. The history of non-recognition, however, will require more than merely diplomatic wordsmithing. The best mechanism would be for the U.S. and the EU to announce that they (along with all EU member states) will recognize Israel within any western border that it declares as defensible, and within which it is willing to offer citizenship to any and all residents—along with any capital within those borders that Israel chooses (presumably Jerusalem). Should some non-Jews wish to leave and some Jews wish to enter those borders, we should encourage resettlement among their kinsmen; we should not enforce any further population movements or transfers (though whatever exchanges we do enforce should follow a symmetric logic). We must also extend NATO membership to Israel, announce again that terrorist infiltration and triggers collective defense responsibilities. As the Gaza debacle demonstrated, however, Israel’s abandonment of its military responsibilities to land beyond its declared borders would be a disaster. It must therefore recast its commitment to areas beyond its borders as a clear military occupation, and take all appropriate steps to relinquish that occupation to responsible authorities (should any ever arise).

• Encourage and support the resettlement and integration of refugees. The dismemberment of an empire, even an inchoate empire, is a messy thing. The realization of self-determination by ethnic minorities in even parts of their historic homelands makes matters even messier. The period between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries saw many such dislocations. Most have worked their way into history. Some have not, and yet others are ongoing. The international approach to refugees that emerged after WW II is based upon a fundamentally flawed theory of justice. For the most part, we pen them up like prisoners or animals,until the war zone from which they fled stabilizes enough to send them back and perpetuate the instability. This approach damages refugees, unstable states, and the regions that surround them. It is morally unconscionable, and helps no one other than the theorists who call it “just” and the bureaucrats who use it to earn their keep. We must invert it, and push for integration, primarily but not exclusively among ethnic kinsmen. We must push for the immediate termination of UNWRA’s charter, the recategorization of refugees as those who truly fled a war zone (rather than their descendants), and the reassignment of the Western Palestinian refugees to UNHCR (for all its faults, far ahead of UNWRA). We must also recognize that the majority of Arab refugees in the region are no longer from Western Palestine, but rather from Iraq. We should act to advocate and encourage resettlement and reintegration soon, before they too begin to become permanent, multi-generational underclasses. As part of this encouragement, it might even be worthwhile to float a novel trial balloon: Israel’s withdrawal from the final vestiges of unclaimed Ottoman territory and the dismemberment of Iraq will leave three primarily Sunni enclaves of questionable status: one each in Gaza, Western Palestine, and Central Iraq. The only potentially good option would be to federate these regions with Jordan into a sizable Levantine Sunni state. The Hashemites have long been the best and most enlightened of the Sunni rulers, and King Abdullah has begun to push a “Jordan First” program to promote nationalism. Were he to extend his borders to his Sunni brethren, the world would owe him a huge debt—and given the inherent instability of all three regions, he would need repayment to survive. Regrettably, such a solution appears unlikely. We are almost certain to muddle through with three anarchic, terror-driven, regions subject to military interventions and occupations or iron-fisted authoritarian control. It is unclear whether short-term peaceful stability is even possible in these areas—giving further impetus to the need to resettle refugees during the occasional crises that will inevitably arise.

• Ignore and sideline the Arab League as an irrelevant artifact of vestigial imperialism. Among the various incomprehensible blunders of America’s early days as Iraq’s declared occupier, the decision to push Iraq back in the Arab League stands out—both for its misreading of regional dynamics and for the lack of criticism it received. The Arab League is a tool of Sunni Arab Imperialism. As a toothless mechanism of an inchoate empire, its ability to achieve anything positive is severely constrained. Its ability to prevent positive developments, on the other hand, is rather impressive. Because almost all positive developments in the region operate against imperial goals, any hardline appeal to imperial ideals generates immediate broad sympathy. Our decision to push Iraq back into the Arab League sent a signal favoring Sunni Arab imperialism and opposing ethnic self-determination. That signal was precisely backwards. We should systematically work to sideline this dreadful organization.

• Promote diplomacy by calling for immediate, unconditional, bilateral diplomatic recognition among all pairs of states in the region, followed by an exchange of ambassadors. Isolate cross-border problems by calling for bilateral solutions. Independent states rise to the fore when empires crumble. The perpetual linkage of unrelated problems plaguing the same region guarantees permanent instability. I have long argued that Saudi Arabia should recognize Israel not as part of some grand design, but rather for the simple reason that they are neighbors with some shared concerns and some sources of tension. If Saudi King Abdullah wishes to propose a plan for regional peace, his ambassador to Jerusalem should arrange a state visit; Abdullah can then present his plan to the Knesset. The notion of a Saudi plan issued via Arab League press release is laughable. We should recognize the Golan Heights for what it is—a bilateral border dispute between two neighbors. The League of Nations assigned the land to Syria in 1922. Syria ruled it for 45 years, used it often as a launching pad for military and terrorist activities, and lost it to Israel in 1967. Israel has since ruled it peacefully for nearly 40 years. We should take no position on this dispute other than to encourage the countries to pursue bilateral negotiations leading to a permanent border and a lasting peace. Similarly the realignment of Iraq and the consequent Shiite and Kurdish secessions from the Sunni Arab Empire will rankle many existing regimes. We will have to work hard to secure universal bilateral recognition from all Arab states, as well as from Turkey. Should an extended federal Jordan emerge, another wave of diplomatic objections seems likely; we will have to work against them. A region of proud independent states negotiating bilateral issues bilaterally provides the brightest prospects for stability and development.

• Develop mechanisms and institutions of regional economic integration. Recognition and negotiation among states may be a good start, but it is hardly a guarantee of stability (see European history 1648-1948). Recent history has taught us, however, that economic integration coupled with bilateral respect can work fairly well (see the EU). The U.S. already has free trade deals with Israel and Jordan. I believe that we extend the Israeli deal to include joint Israel-Egypt ventures. I suspect that if Iraq ever stabilizes, we will extend trade benefits there. A Japanese consortium just announced plans to fund large parts of a joint Israeli-Jordanian joint venture in their southern deserts. I have long argued that the U.S. should negotiate a free trade deal with Turkey—in large part because I do not believe that the EU will ever agree to Turkish accession. We should try to forge these individual ventures into a regional trade area, promoting skill exchange and educational opportunities—with the major carrot being favored access to American markets for countries that choose to participate.

• Promote the growth of civil society and opposition movements based outside the Mosque in all states of the region. Promote the development of liberal national institutions throughout the Sunni Arab world. Assign American diplomatic personnel the permanent task of reviewing and grading each regime’s progression toward liberalism. These ideas are not particularly new. Many people have written about them in many places. They are good ideas in their own right, critical for both individual development and economic development throughout the region, and good steps toward both peace and stability. Most recent articles that I have seen focus on their specific potential for achieving regime change in Iran without direct military intervention, but they apply with equal force to all states in the broader Middle East with the likely exceptions of Israel and Turkey. Good things can happen in the absence of liberal institutions, but as the history of “Golden Ages” has demonstrated, liberal institutions are needed to sustain positive development. I could write forever about the importance of the basic rights that Americans take for granted, but this essay is already too long. I will thus merely keep these ideas in place to ensure that they don’t get lost in the shuffle, and defer a fuller exposition to yet another day.

With that list in place, I will wrap up my lengthy two-part discussion of Inchoate Imperialism and its effects on the broader Middle East. I recognize that my underlying theory runs counter to much conventional wisdom; that many of my policy prescriptions require backpedaling from long-asserted (if not deeply felt) American diplomatic positions; and that many of my policy prescriptions represent radical longshots. So why should anyone care? For the simple reason that the empirical evidence is overwhelming. The post-Ottoman narrative explaining the modern Middle East has led to perpetual instability, brutal illiberalism, poverty among riches, widespread illiteracy, permanent underemployment, multi-generational refugees, numerous oppressed minorities, and nearly universal violence and rage. The only two ethnic groups fortunate enough to pull themselves out of this morass—the Jews and the Turks—remain perpetual targets of those mired within it. Westerners, and in particular Americans, are objects of envy, venom, and when possible, violence. Were there ever a case for ignoring conventional wisdom, taking a fresh look at recent history, and developing a new analysis, the track record of the post-Ottoman Middle East presents it.

For nearly a century, outsiders have attempted to impose short-term stability on this region. Despite their many successes, the region itself seems to grow progressively worse in the intermediate- and long-terms. Why? One reason may be that its problems are endemic. If so, then short-term stability makes a disastrous climax inevitable. Stability in the face of endemic problems allows belligerents to avoid tough choices and reforms, stew in their own bile, and improve their armaments. If a broad regional war is inevitable, our stability has only increased its bloodiness. We should let it happen now; one more deferral in the name of stability will push us into the realm of an inevitable nuclear conflict.

The ideas that I have outlined here work in a different direction. They begin with underlying conflicts and philosophies, and suggest ways to address them. By and large, we need to oppose imperialism, contain revolutions, and create viable alternative philosophies with promises of greater benefits ahead. We must increase both carrots and sticks. And we must do it in a manner consistent with long-held American ideals and beliefs and long-term American national interests. We must focus on these long-term goals even when specific day-to-day actions require behavior that seems inconsistent with our stated values—remember, even a correctly chosen “least bad” option will generate results that look bad.

So that’s it in a nutshell: U.S. policy in the Middle East should support American values: anti-Imperialism, anti-revolutionary, pro-minority self-determination, pro-economic openness and integration, and pro-individual rights and liberties. It’s certainly more easily said than done, but if we don’t recognize the challenges and articulate our values, it won’t get done at all. This two-part essay is my modest contribution to a clean start.

Posted by Bruce Abramson from on 03/15 at 06:47 PM in Foreign Affairs and the World beyond Our Borders