The Informationist

Neoconservative Triumphalism

Charles Krauthammer’s The Neoconservative Convergence in the current issue of Commentary promises a critical analysis in its opening paragraph:

The post-cold-war era has seen a remarkable ideological experiment: over the last fifteen years, each of the three major American schools of foreign policy—realism, liberal internationalism, and neoconservatism—has taken its turn at running things. (A fourth school, isolationism, has a long pedigree, but has yet to recover from Pearl Harbor and probably never will; it remains a minor source of dissidence with no chance of becoming a governing ideology.) There is much to be learned from this unusual and unplanned experiment.

Unfortunately, Krauthammer failed to deliver. Much of what he said about neoconservatism is true enough, but his analysis of the period between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the destruction of the twin towers was disappointing. He seemed to be more interested in partisan politics than in informed analysis.

Krauthammer correctly described the failure of Bush pére’s realism in the Middle East, but seemed strangely forgiving of its shortcomings in Europe. Europe’s salvation was that the realists proved unable to impose their will upon the unraveling Soviet Empire. The Arab world remained mired in its suicidal sectarian squabbles because the Bush administration successfully maintained the status quo and squelched its potential transformation.

When it came to Clinton’s liberal internationalism, on the other hand, Krauhammer forgave success and emphasized only failure. The Clinton administration’s early foreign adventures (i.e., Iraq, Somalia) essentially continued the realist’s policies. At some point after its incoherent response to the Haitian crisis, however, the administration found its own philosophical moorings—for both better and worse. Clinton excelled at finding ways to improve the world, but seemed unable to recognize that not everyone wanted to see such improvement. Thus, in Central and Eastern Europe where people did yearn for freedom and empowerment, Clinton pushed NATO enlargement, and pacified the Balkans. He avoided what could have become a global financial crisis, and furthered the causes of globalization and free trade. In the Middle East, where “leaders” like Arafat actually preferred war to peace, Clinton seemed unable to grasp that his “partners” did not share his goals-with disastrous consequences.

George W. Bush entered office intent upon restoring his father’s realist vision, but became a born again neocon on September 11. Many of the administration’s actions from that point onward differed in kind from those of either Bush pére or Clinton. Those differences, however, were largely a function of the changes that 9/11 wrought on the American body politic; the public would never have supported many of them prior to tasting terror up close. As a doctrinal matter, Bush’s neoconservatism differs little from Clinton’s liberal internationalism. Both philosophies espouse the universality of liberalism, capitalism, democracy, and individual rights. Both believe that nation building requires time, patience, American investment, and direct involvement. Both look for local liberal leaders to empower. Both value international support, but will act without it to protect American interests. These similarities dwarf debates at the margins of political philosophy. Operatives on both sides of the aisle insist that fundamental, doctrinal differences separate liberal internationalism from neoconservatism, yet most disputes merely split hairs about which authoritarians are trustworthy, or whether the UN is wholly irredeemable or only in need of fundamental reform.

I was hoping that Krauthammer would use his respected voice to move the foreign policy debate forward, by showing that the “Bush doctrine’s” values are American values that cut across party lines. I was sorely disappointed. His attempt to mend fences with realists might be good for the Republican Party, but it is bad for America—and worse for the values and for the doctrinal foreign policy that Mr. Krauthammer and I both favor.

Posted by Bruce Abramson from on 07/25 at 06:36 PM in American Government, Politics, and Domestic Policies, Foreign Affairs and the World beyond Our Borders