The Informationist

Reality Trumps Realism (finally)

American foreign policy has long been saddled with a misnamed theory known as “Realism.” Though is certainly sounds good—after all, who among us would oppose a realistic approach to any of our policies?—its basic precepts have long run counter to America’s national interests. To put the matter succinctly, Realists view the world as an essentially immutable place beset by occasional crises. The goal of American foreign policy should therefore be to resolve the crisis and to restore the status quo ante. Some of our allegedly finest “statesmen” have espoused variants of this approach (think Eisenhower, Kissinger, Papa Bush, James Baker, Brzezinski, Scowcroft). All have devised foreign policies disastrous for the U.S. and for the world.

Certainly, crises do erupt and it is never a bad thing when they subside. That fundamental truism explains the illusory allure of Realism. Unfortunately, most crises explode for a reason, and some crises provide transformative opportunities capable of alleviating the underlying reasons. Realists never (or at least, rarely) address either of these truisms. As a result, America’s foreign policy Realists typically arrive on the scene, find a cauldron boiling over, proceed to weld it shut, leave the flame on high, and then declare victory and go home. Invariably, we are forced to then return at a later date, forced to face the same problem in even more dangerous states of agitation. For three excellent examples, consider America’s bungling of the Sinai in 1956, Iran in 1979, or Iraq in 1990.

For most of the post-WWII era, Realism dominated the Republican Party (though a pacifistic variant also contaminated Democratic thinking). The Reagan/Schultz team was a bright exception, but when Papa Bush took over from Reagan, the GOP returned to its old debate between isolationists and Realists. Though the Papa Bush team was the most Realist we’ve ever seen, the isolationists had risen to the fore by the late ‘90s. In 2000, Governor Bush ran as a Realist/isolationist candidate. Fortunately, after 9/11 he woke up, listened marginally to some neocons and seriously to his aggressive nationalist advisors (specifically Cheney and Rumsfeld). We would, of course, all be better off had he actually implemented a neocon policy (not to mention a competent policy that included details like contingency plans and adequate resources), but even our current incompetent aggressive nationalist posture is better than Realism. The best sign of that improvement was the apoplexy of The Scowcroft—a man who shares the “always wrong” award with Brzezinski.

Realism remained a force—at least in theory—until this week. The administration’s explanation that a cease-fire in Southern Lebanon might resolve the current crisis but would make future crises inevitable is the final nail in its coffin. We have replaced Realism with reality. Let’s hope that the corpse of this dangerous foreign policy theory remains buried, never again to darken the chambers of American discourse. Goodbye and good riddance. I’m almost tempted to say “rest in peace,” but given the damage that the Realists have imposed on America and the world I prefer a simple “rot in hell.”

Posted by Bruce Abramson from on 07/21 at 02:55 PM in American Government, Politics, and Domestic Policies, Foreign Affairs and the World beyond Our Borders